Reflections on the Naming of Concepts in Science
From chaos to concept: naming as the first step in understanding.
I have observed a rather intriguing phenomenon. Namely—the act of naming phenomena, mechanisms, theories, theorems, etc., seems to grant us a certain kind of power over them, as it makes them easier to identify and describe. In a sense, this is a form of labeling that gives us a feeling of control over reality.
This can metaphorically be compared to the taming of a wild animal. When we begin to tame such a creature, the very first, almost symbolic, act is often to name it. We have no guarantee that we’ll manage to domesticate the wild beast, just as we cannot be certain we will fully comprehend a given scientific issue. But at the very least, we know it marks the beginning of a difficult journey toward deeper understanding. The ability to categorize something—to give it a human dimension out of chaos and uncertainty—enables us to move forward.
In cognitive psychology, there is a view that the human mind reduces the complexity of the world by categorizing—that is, by naming and labeling. This in turn provides a sense of predictability and control. The mind needs names in order to create a map of reality.
It’s often the case that even just articulating something in human language brings an awareness of its existence. Notice: even as I attempt to describe this phenomenon right now, I am demonstrating an awareness that this “something” truly exists.
At this very moment, I feel the need to somehow categorize it, so I can refer to it more easily in the future—for example, by using a name rather than having to explain the concept from scratch each time. Yet, I have found no term—neither in linguistics, psychology, nor philosophy—that precisely captures this phenomenon.
Strangely enough, it seems to me that this phenomenon is profoundly fundamental to human thinking, and yet there is no single, concise term that fully encompasses it.
Using strictly scientific language, one could say that it is a psychological-cognitive need to name a phenomenon as an epistemic act of taming and gaining cognitive authority over it. Since we are now looking for such a cognitive anchor, perhaps we should coin a new term to describe this phenomenon. If no existing term fits, I believe it might be worthwhile to propose our own.
My suggested name for the phenomenon is:
Phenomenological Hypothesis of Cognitive Incarnation (PHCI)
Below is a breakdown of the meaning behind each component of this term:
"Phenomenological" – roots the hypothesis in the tradition of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger; it implies a focus on how phenomena reveal themselves in consciousness rather than on their purely objective analysis.
"Hypothesis" – a scientific term, which opens the door to further study and interpretation.
"Cognitive" – links the term to cognitive psychology, theory of mind, mental structures, and language.
"Incarnation" – although often associated with theology, here it is used metaphorically: the gaining of form, embodiment, presence in consciousness. As long as something remains unnamed, it exists like a ghost; naming gives it “a body”—a presence in language and thought.
A possible formal definition might be:
Phenomenological Hypothesis of Cognitive Incarnation (PHCI) – a philosophical concept that assumes the act of naming a phenomenon in human language marks the moment of its epistemic "incarnation"—a transition from the realm of unrecognized and intangible experience into a cognitive object that can be described, analyzed, and integrated within the structure of consciousness. The hypothesis has a phenomenological nature and is based on the assumption that language not only describes the world but constitutes its presence in the field of experience.
Of course, this remains a philosophical-psychological concept. However, it can be developed further and applied, for example, as a mechanism for expanding conceptual awareness and engaging people in discussions about language, consciousness, epistemology, and phenomenology.